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In the EU democratic deficit debate inter-parliamentary cooperation has gained attention in its 
function to link the two levels of representation: the European Parliament and the national 
parliaments. Ideally we would witness the mutually supportive cooperation in an ever closer 
“multi-level parliamentary field” (Crum and Fossum, 2013). The aim of this paper is to 
understand motivation for inter-parliamentary cooperation on EU issues in cross-country 
comparison. What factors explain how national parliaments set their priorities in the various 
formal and informal channels of inter-parliamentary cooperation?  
Inter-parliamentary cooperation has been found to benefit the opposition parties more than the 
majorities of a parliament, as an alternative source of information to better control the own 
government. One assumption of this study is that the strength of opposition parties in the 
domestic context determines a parliament’s approach to inter-parliamentary cooperation. The 
paper further tests the relevance of resources, the size of a member state and the strength of 
formal EU scrutiny rights. 
Four member states selected as most-different cases serve to test the hypotheses: Denmark, 
Germany, France and Portugal. Empirically, the paper follows both, a qualitative and 
quantitative approach. Evidence gained from interviews with parliamentarians and 
administrators is combined with an analysis of participation in bilateral, regional and EU-wide 
inter-parliamentary meetings. The advantage of the study lies in its comparative perspective 
and the mixed-method approach which allows for linking the factual participation rates with 
the evaluation of the cooperative practices by the interviewees. 
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Introduction 
Since the beginning of the 1990s a debate on the democratic deficit of the European Union 
(EU) has evolved and is still ongoing. One fundamental critique points to the lack of the 
possibility to organize opposition to EU policies within the system (see Mair 2007: 6) which 
risks detaching the citizens from the polity. If the channel of opposing certain contents is not 
available, the risk is that dissatisfaction may turn into opposition to the system as such. The 
increasing number of votes for Eurosceptic parties in the European Parliament elections may 
indicate such a development. Mair (2007) argues that agreements at EU level reduce the 
number of policy alternatives available at the national level. In the intergovernmental 
negotiations in the Council of the EU and the European Council opposition views are not 
represent. Due to the second order character of the EP elections and the lack of a coherent EU 
public sphere the European Parliament cannot by itself serve as a sufficient substitute for 
voicing alternatives to EU policy choices. Thus, the basic function of opposition to voice 
criticism and demonstrate alternatives to government decisions is not fulfilled for EU 
decision-making. 
The attention for the role of national parliaments in EU affairs in academia and political 
debate stems from the concern of a lack of control over national governments. National 
parliaments, which host the plurality of perspectives induced by national elections, have been 
understood as the “losers” of EU integration (see Maurer and Wessels, 2001). Their scope of 
influence is directly affected by the pre-agreements at EU level which only need to be 
transposed to the national legislation. However, parliaments cannot be understood as unitary 
actors opposing the government, as the cleavage runs along majority–opposition lines. While 
the majority parties in parliament may still have fairly good access to information through 
informal channels and some influence within the party, opposition parties suffer severely from 
being cut out from EU negotiations.  
Inter-parliamentary cooperation is seen as one possible solution in the search for a better 
democratic order of the European Union. It could be a platform to balance intergovernmental 
decision-making. The exchange at the transnational level can provide members of national 
parliaments (MPs) with valuable information about interests and perspectives of their 
colleagues in other EU member states. The knowledge about the positions of other member 
states would enhance MPs ability to assess the governments’ win-set in EU negotiations 
allowing for better parliamentary scrutiny (see Benz 2011). Thus, inter-parliamentary 
cooperation (IPC) could not only strengthen parliaments position vis-á-vis their governments, 
but also give opposition parties an opportunity to voice their criticism at EU level.  
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While closer interaction among parliaments in the EU is desirable from a normative 
perspective, there are a number of practical constraints for cooperation as rivalries over 
current (and future) competences, the lack of resources or political will (see Herranz-Surralés 
2014, Costa and Latek 2007, Westlake 1995). Research on IPC started out from a description 
of different forms of formal meetings (Bengtson, 2007; Costa and Latek 2007), and case 
studies on different policy fields such as Ruiz de Garibay (2013) and Mitsilegas (2007) on 
Justice and Home Affairs or Huff (2013), Wouters and Raube (2013) and Herranz-Surralés 
(2014) on cooperation in Common Foreign and Security Policy. Recent publications have 
explained the motivation for cooperation and to analyse actual practice (see Crum and 
Fossum, 2013; Miklin, 2013). On the side of theory, Crum and Fossum (2009) have 
developed the idea of a ‘multi-level parliamentary field’ and argue for a more comprehensive 
analysis of parliamentary control.  
The heterogeneity of interests and ideologies in an EU of 28 member states becomes 
especially relevant for parliamentary institutions whose defining characteristic it is to give 
voice to diverging points of views in a society. Considering the differences of each 
representative body, one crucial question is the overlap in interests in IPC. A coherent 
approach across all parliaments would allow developing structures for effective coordination 
and exchange much faster, than very diverse understandings. Therefore, this paper aims at 
explaining the participation of national parliaments in the various channels of IPC in the EU. 
Based on a mixed-method approach the analysis covers the practices and evaluation of IPC of 
four country cases: Germany, France, Denmark and Portugal.  
The following section defines the potential benefit of IPC for MPs and lays out the formats of 
cooperation and their functions. Second, the paper derives expectations on the variation in 
parliaments` use of these means of cooperation. The empirical part is based on a quantitative 
analysis of MPs and officials` participation in inter-parliamentary meetings, expert reports and 
interviews. The conclusion summarizes the results and links them back to the question of 
IPC´s relevance for the democratic legitimacy of the EU. 
Functions of inter-parliamentary cooperation 
In the literature on national parliaments scrutiny of EU affairs, information access is seen as 
precondition for any influence on legislation. Especially studies based on the principal agent 
approach stress the problem of information asymmetry between parliament as the principal 
and government in the role of agent (for example Auel 2007). Since the introduction of the 
Lisbon Treaty all parliaments receive official EU documents directly from the Commission. 
Thus, they have equal access to EU documents independent from their government. However, 
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the numerous documents and their often rather technical nature require an efficient sifting 
procedure within parliament to make use of this information (Winzen 2012: 660). 
Furthermore, the knowledge on positions of member states and negotiation processes must be 
achieved from other sources than the Commission. Naturally the own government is the first 
address to receive complementary information. For parliamentarians from governing parties 
the informal exchange with government will in many cases be the most efficient access to 
information. For the parliamentary opposition, however, information access may be limited to 
the requirements defined in laws or rules of procedure on the kind and timing of information 
government needs to provide to parliament.  
Inter-parliamentary cooperation can be a valuable tool for national parliamentarians to 
achieve independent information from third parties on the upcoming EU legislation and to 
understand the negotiation process at EU level. The exchange of information is probably the 
most relevant function of IPC since inter-parliamentary forums lack any decision-making 
capacity.  
The literature on IPC identifies the coordination of common positions in relation to EU 
legislation or subsidiarity control in the Early Warning Mechanism (EWM) as another 
function of IPC (see Miklin, 2013; Knutelska, 2013, p. 38; Bengtson, 2007). The coordination 
of reasoned opinions to achieve a “yellow card” within the Early Warning Mechanism is 
probably more frequently practiced than coordination on NPs positions on policy positions 
(see Cooper 2013 for coordination for the first “yellow card” on Monti II). However, Miklin 
(2013) has shown for the Austrian parliament that the Green party group coordinates positions 
with its EU counterparts to a certain extent. For other party groups the coordination was less 
relevant.  
Furthermore, formal IPC has the important function to establish a network of EU 
representatives who hold similar responsibilities within their parliament and can profit in the 
long term from their personal contacts (see COSAC 21
st
 biannual report, 2014). Networking 
can be seen as a first step towards access of information. The personal contacts of a network 
are latent connections, which can be activated when information on a specific question or the 
position of another institution is required. Thus, network building is closely linked to 
information access. 
In sum, three functions of IPC may benefit MPs scrutiny of EU issues: the access to 
information on negotiations at EU level and other MP positions independent from the own 
government, the coordination of positions on subsidiarity questions or policy content and 
networking among MPs with shared interests and officials across chambers. 
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Channels of inter-parliamentary cooperation in the EU 
As this paper aims at analysing the intensity and the kind of cooperation national parliaments 
embrace, this section provides an overview of channels of IPC.
1
 Depending on the format of 
cooperation, the functions of IPC described in the previous section have different weight.  
A broad range of formal inter-parliamentary meetings has evolved since the first conference 
of presidents and speakers of national parliaments in the EU (in the following “EU Speakers` 
Conference”) in 1963 and the first Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs 
(known under its French acronym COSAC) in 1989. COSAC and the EU Speakers` 
Conference are the most established forums for general exchange on EU issues and exchange 
of best practice in EU scrutiny. The annual EU Speakers` Conference task is to represent a 
‘forum for the exchange of opinions, information and experiences among the Speakers’ and to 
‘oversee the coordination of inter-parliamentary EU activities’ (Art. 2, see EU Speakers’ 
Conference 2010). It is the only arrangement with some formal decision-making capacity i.e. 
on new structures of IPC.   
The biannual COSAC is anchored in Protocol No. 1 of the Lisbon Treaty (Art. 10) which 
defines its purpose to “promote the exchange of information and best practice between 
national Parliaments and the European Parliament“. Due to the longevity and prominence of 
COSAC, one would expect that parliaments see a clear benefit of the format: in terms of 
information access and networking among the participating EAC chairs and members. It may 
furthermore serve the coordination of positions on subsidiarity questions. Cooper (2013) has 
shown in an analysis of the process leading to the first yellow card within the Early Warning 
Mechanism that the submittal of reasoned opinions was coordinated at a COSAC meeting in 
April 2012 under the Danish presidency.  
Within the realm of formal cooperation, the European Parliament and the parliament of the 
member state holding the rotating presidencies organize further inter-parliamentary meetings. 
These are focussed on contents of specific policy areas and address MPs from the respective 
specialized committees and take place on average twice a month. To Inter-parliamentary 
Committee Meetings (ICM) the EP invites committee members from the respective 
specialized committees in national parliaments to their session.
2
 Inter-parliamentary meetings 
organized by the parliament of the member state holding the rotating presidency of the EU 
                                                 
1 For a detailed review of the formal rules, meeting location, organization and tasks of the different inter-
parliamentary meetings, please see Hefftler and Gattermann, 2015. 
2 Another format are Joint Committee Meetings which are co-organized by the parliament of the presidency and 
the EP and up until 2012 Joint Parliamentary Meetings (see European Parliament, 2014). Since the number of 
meetings is very low, they are not included in the analysis here. 
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focus on committee chairs of the various policy areas.
3
 Compared to the COSAC or EU 
Speakers` Conference, both forms of inter-parliamentary meetings are more focused in terms 
of content. They treat specific policy areas and bring together experts of the respective fields. 
Miklin (2013: 32) argues that these meeting formats have the highest benefit in terms of 
information access on upcoming EU policies. 
At all formal inter-parliamentary meetings, administrators from the national parliaments are 
present in support of the MPs (or as substitute). One important link among parliaments in the 
EU are the permanent representatives of national parliaments in the EP. Most often one 
member of staff is located in Brussels as an “antenna”, thus, for early information on the 
proceedings in the EU institutions and for organizational support for visits of MPs in Brussels. 
Currently all national parliaments have a permanent representation in Brussels. The 
permanent representatives of national parliaments hold regular Monday morning meetings to 
exchange on the on-going proceedings in their home parliaments and to coordinate on the 
EWS.  
Beyond the formal meetings at political level and the administrative structures, there is of 
course informal cooperation among parliamentarians and officials. Informal contacts can take 
any form ranging from multi- or bilateral meetings, phone calls and emails. One structuring 
factor for informal cooperation is the organization along party lines on the vertical (EP-NP) 
and horizontal (NP-NP) dimension. MEPs of the same nationality and party are often a first 
point of reference for informal inter-parliamentary contacts (see Miklin and Crum 2011, 
Raunio 2009). The informal contacts will surely serve most directly specific needs for 
information. However, they are more difficult to measure. 
Variation across parliaments  
For any parliament – and especially the parliamentary majority – the own government will be 
the first point of reference for information on EU affairs. Derived from this logic, I expect 
parliaments with strong prerogatives on scrutiny of EU affairs to be less inclined to invest 
their resources in IPC. The information rights are relevant. The capacity to influence the 
government position before (European) Council meetings as through mandating rights should 
further reduce the incentives for IPC since the direct influence on the government may be 
judged to be more effective. Cooperation among parliaments is after all an indirect instrument 
where no direct policy impact is possible. Thus, as resources are scarce, MPs will be less 
                                                 
3 To avoid confusion the term inter-parliamentary meetings is used to cover both meeting types: Inter-
parliamentary Committee Meetings by the EP and Chairpersons meetings organized by the rotating presidency. 
The Inter-parliamentary Conference on CFSP and CSDP is included within the chairpersons meetings. The 
European Parliamentary Week which takes place since 2013 is summarized under ICMs of the EP. 
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willing to spend their time and budget on travelling to inter-parliamentary meetings, if 
information flow and degree of influence over the government position is satisfactory. 
H1: A national parliament with strong scrutiny rights over EU affairs, will less 
frequently engage in inter-parliamentary meetings/cooperation. 
In his study of the Austrian parliament, Miklin (2013) argues that the incentive for opposition 
parties to engage in IPC is higher due to increased interest in information from third parties. 
Based on the assumption of an overall interest in cooperation from opposition MPs, I expect 
that they will be more present if their parliament has formal rights which strongly protect the 
parliamentary minority. For example, the organization of committee membership and 
appointments to committee chairs will partially determine the extent in which opposition MPs 
participate in inter-parliamentary meetings. 
H2: Opposition parties with strong position in their domestic parliament will be more 
present at formal inter-parliamentary meetings. 
A basic condition to be able to participate in inter-parliamentary meetings with high frequency 
is the parliament’s resources. The overall size of the parliament in terms of number of MPs 
and its should determine to a significant degree the participation rate in formal meetings.
4
 In a 
large parliamentary chamber it is more likely that one or several MPs can fit the inter-
parliamentary meetings in their schedule.  
H3: A parliament with higher resources in terms of number of MPs and overall budget 
available will be more likely to send MPs to all forms of inter-parliamentary meetings. 
The three factors of the hypothesis, strength of scrutiny rights over EU affairs, the role of 
opposition parties and resources, may interact with each other. Thus, they either reinforce or 
balance each other. For a small parliament with limited resources but weak EU scrutiny rights 
the interest in IPC could be so high that it is more active than a parliament with extensive 
resources but strong scrutiny rights. When taking just the overall parliamentary budget and 
number of MPs as indicator (not the budget allocated for travelling), the political will could 
supersede the material constraints. 
Data and method 
The case selection of the four member states aims at a most-different case design to test the 
hypotheses. The aim is to cover variation on the three dimensions of the resources of the 
parliament, the scrutiny rights in EU affairs and the formal rules on power sharing with the 
opposition parties (see Table 1). 
 
                                                 
4 Yet, political will should enable even small parliaments to allocate their resources with priority on cooperation. 
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 France Germany Denmark Portugal 
No. of chambers Bicameral Bicameral Unicameral Unicameral 
Political system Semi-presidential Parliamentary Parliamentary 
Semi-
parliamentary
5
 
Type of government  
Jun 2007 to Jun 
2012: single party 
Since Jun 2012: 
coalition 
Nov 2009 to Aug 
2013: Coalition 
Since Sep 2013: 
Grand coalition 
Oct 2007 to Sep 
2011: minority 
(coalition)  
Since Oct 2011: 
minority (coalition) 
Sep 2009 to Jun 
2011: minority 
Since Jun 2011: 
coalition 
Size  
(Total no. of seats) 
AN: 577 
SE: 348 
Bundestag: 622 
Bundesrat: 69 
175 230 
Resources (overall 
budget and staff)6 
AN: 606.1 mio 
PPP $/ 1.238 staff 
SE: 382.8 mio 
PPP $/ 1.143 staff 
BT: 795.1 mio PPP 
$/ 2.788 staff 
BR: 26.1 mio PPP 
$/ 204 staff 
NN / 726 staff 
180.6 mio PPP $/ 
380 staff 
Strength in EU affairs7 
AN: medium 
SE: medium 
BT: high 
BR: high  
high low 
Table 1: Overview on case study countries. AN = Assemblée Nationale, SE = Sénat, BT = Bundestag, BR = 
Bundesrat. 
 
The chambers selected for in-depth analysis vary significantly in terms of size and resources. 
The German Bundesrat is composed of only 69 delegates and a very limited budget, while the 
German lower house is the best equipped in terms of resources (795.1 mio PPP $/ 2.788 staff) 
and number of MPs (currently 622). Portugal and Denmark range both roughly around two 
hundred MPs. However, Danish MPs can rely on a higher number of staff than Portuguese 
ones. The two French chambers have about the same number of staff at hand (the Assemblée 
1.238, the Sénat 1.143). But the significantly larger Assemblée National with 577 MPs has an 
almost double as high budget available than the French upper house. 
The Danish parliament, the Folketing, has been treated as the textbook model of 
parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs due to the mandating rights for the government’s position 
in the Council (Christensen, 2015). The German Bundestag is similarly famous for its strong 
position vis-a-vis the government (at least since the recent revisions of the formal control 
rights initiated by the German Constitutional Court) (Höing, 2015). On the other hand 
Portugal and France represent two political systems of a large and a small member state where 
the power of parliament is rather limited (Jancic, 2015; Tacea and Thomas, 2015). 
                                                 
5 See Jancic (2015). 
6 Information on the budget and number of staff was retrieved from the IPU website: 
http://www.ipu.org/parline/parlinesearch.asp.  
7 According to OPAL institutional strength score, see Auel et al. 2015. 
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The logic of opposition in a bicameral system differs in so far as a potential majority in the 
upper house of non-government parties may allow for some leverage for opposition parties 
(Tsebelis 2008). The study covers two bicameral (France and Germany) and two unicameral 
systems (Denmark and Portugal), coinciding with the size of the respective countries and their 
parliaments. Furthermore, France represents the rare case of a semi-presidential system within 
the EU which is considered to leave opposition in a weaker position (Thomas and Tacea, 
2015). In view of the type of government, parties in coalition compose most governments. 
Some variation can be found due to the minority governments in Denmark in the legislative 
period from Oct 2007 to Sep 2011 and the current one, the minority government in Portugal 
from September 2009 to June 2011 and the single party government of UMP in France before 
June 2012. 
To understand the function of the different channels of cooperation and to test the hypotheses, 
this study relies on a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods. As indicator of the 
participation in formal IPC the registration of MPs and officials are analysed from Denmark, 
France, Germany and Portugal in inter-parliamentary meetings in Brussels and those 
organized by the rotating presidency in the time span form 2011 to 2013.
8
 The lists of 
participants are available on the European Parliament website (European Parliament, 2014) 
and on the websites of the rotating presidencies. As the Lisbon Treaty has aimed at 
strengthening the cooperation among parliaments, the time of the Post-Lisbon phase is 
deemed most adequate for analysis. The lists of participants have to be considered with some 
caution, as last minute changes and absences may not be included in the registration list. The 
lists should, however, indicate the rough trends of the variation among member states’ 
participation according. They allow differentiating by meeting type, party affiliation of the 
members and their function. All officials are included in the registration lists. 
To answer the question on the intensity and kind of IPC of a national parliament the following 
indicators are assessed: the overall participation rate of MPs and officials and the participation 
according to different meeting types. Beyond mere frequencies the repetition of participation 
is a crucial indicator for MPs` and officials` ability to form a network. Thus, for the three 
years under analysis the paper assesses who comes repeatedly.  
The quantitative analysis is complemented by interview data from the four case study 
countries. On the one hand this allows putting the quantitative data into perspective in its 
perceived relevance compared to informal cooperative practices and, on the other hand, it 
                                                 
8     Data is missing for the Inter-parliamentary meeting organized by the Irish presidency on 16 and 17 June 
2013 of the Chairpersons' Communications, Education and Transport and for the Inter-parliamentary meeting 
organized by the Danish presidency on 7 and 8 June 2012 of the chairpersons of agriculture. 
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allows assessing the evaluation of the different channels of IPC. The interviews on which the 
analysis is based were conducted in the framework of the OPAL project in the time period 
between May 2012 and June 2013. Overall, this study can draw on 41 interviews (see Table 
2).  
Country Date and place 
of interview 
Interview 
partners from 
government 
parties 
Interview 
partners from 
opposition 
parties 
Interview 
partners from 
administration 
Total number 
of interviewees 
Denmark Nov 2012 in 
Kopenhagen 
5 
 
1 8 14 
France  May 2012 in 
Paris 
4 0 8 12 
Germany  May 2013 in 
Berlin 
4 5 10 19 
Portugal June 2013 in 
Lisbon 
3 1 3 7 
Total number 
of interviewees 
    52 
Table 2: Overview of the number of interviewees and roles of interview partners. 
In each member state, members of parliament – in most cases with a specialization on EU 
issues – were interviewed as well as a number of administrators engaged in EU affairs.9 The 
interviews were semi-structured. Interview partners were asked for the form of participation 
of their legislature in IPC in the EU, their personal experiences and their judgement on the 
relevance. 
A third source to cross-validate the findings is the COSAC biannual reports (the 21st report 
from June 2014 and the 18th from April 2012) and expert reports as available in chapters of 
the Palgrave Handbook on National Parliaments and the EU on the respective member state 
(Hefftler et al. 2015). 
Results 
This paper aims at understanding the functions various channels of formal and informal IPC 
perform and the use thereof by four case study countries. After an overview of the overall 
engagement in IPC of the four member states under analysis, the presentation of the results is 
organised along the channels of IPC: the general conferences on EU affairs (EU Speakers` 
Conference and COSAC), inter-parliamentary committee meetings (organized by the EP) and 
meetings of chairpersons (organized by the rotating presidency), the administrative level (esp. 
                                                 
9  Interviews were conducted with the assurance of the anonymity of the interviewee. References therefore 
follow the system of abbreviations for “country/chamber/political or administrative level/number”, for 
example PLSEP01 for Poland, Senate, Political level, First interview. 
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the permanent representatives of national parliaments) and informal links to the EP and across 
national chambers or parliaments. 
Overall participation in formal inter-parliamentary meetings 
For a first assessment, the overall participation rate for the three years under analysis (2011 to 
2013) indicates the intensity with which the six chambers are present at formal inter-
parliamentary meetings (see Table 3). Overall, almost one hundred different inter-
parliamentary meetings have taken place within the time period under investigation.  
The German Bundesrat has by far the lowest overall turn-out, followed with some distance by 
the French Sénat and the Danish Folketing. The two upper chambers are both less engaged 
than the lower houses of the respective member state (especially in the German case this may 
be explained by the nature of the Bundesrat composed of Länder representatives and the 
limited size). The German Bundestag, as its resources would lead to expect, is represented 
strongly. However, disconfirming hypothesis 3 on the relevance of resources the Assembleia 
da República of Portugal has an even higher participation rate of MPs than the Bundestag. For 
Portugal the idea to voice its position and to be present at meetings seems to be a motivation 
to participate with such high frequency (PTP01). It is important “not to leave an empty chair” 
(PTA03). Thus, despite the budget cuts during the Euro crisis the Portuguese parliament made 
a sustained effort to send at least one MP to all inter-parliamentary meetings. Thus, the overall 
participation of MPs does not strictly follow the rule of the resources available as laid out in 
H3. The political will of how to allocate resources may be more relevant. 
 
SUM MPs officials SUM MP & official 
Denmark 76(56) 100(99) 176(156) 
France-NA 85 87 172 
France-SE 73 80 153 
Germany-BT 126 167 293 
Germany-BR 39 38 77 
Portugal 160 69 229 
Table 3: Participation rate in inter-parliamentary meetings all formats10 from 2011 to 2013. Numbers in brackets 
indicate the participation rate for Denmark excluding meetings during the Danish presidency. 
 
Looking at the number of officials participating in the meetings the factor of resources seems 
to play a stronger role. The Bundestag clearly sticks out with a number of 167 officials 
present at the meetings. In most chambers the rate of officials participating is equal or higher 
                                                 
10 That is the EU Speakers Conference – including the preparatory meetings at administrative level –, COSAC, 
Inter-Parliamentary Meetings organized by the EP or the rotating presidency incl. the Inter-Parliamentary 
Conference on CFSP and CSDP as well as the European Parliamentary Week in 2013) 
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than the number of MPs. Except for Portugal where almost double as many MPs participate in 
relation to the number of officials. 
Another dimension of the intensity with which national parliaments cooperate is the 
frequency with which MPs participate in formal meetings. While an administrator from the 
Portuguese parliament indicates that her points of contact in other national parliaments 
administrations have evolved from COSAC meetings (PTA01), a member of staff from the 
French Assemblée experienced the opposite: the exchange of business cards did not feed into 
any follow up or long term exchange (FSEA01). The bilateral and informal contacts which 
may evolve from contacts established at formal meetings is difficult to measure (see however 
Miklin and Crum 2011). Yet, the repeated participation in inter-parliamentary meetings can 
serve as indicator for network building. Table 4 shows the number of times with which MPs 
or officials have participated at any inter-parliamentary meetings of any format in the time 
period from Jan 2011 to Dec 2013. 
 
Frequencies 1 time 2 to 4 times 5 to 10 times more than 10 
Denmark 40 23 7 3 
France-NA 57 24 8 0 
France-SE 51 23 4 2 
Germany-BT 75 54 10 3 
Germany-BR 21 9 4 0 
Portugal 64 19 7 2 
Table 4: Repetition of participation at inter-parliamentary meetings of any format. 
These numbers are rather disillusioning. For all chambers half to two-third of persons only 
participated one single time. The fact that they did not return to this kind of exchange suggests 
that they did not experience it as an effective use of their time. However, a relevant group of 
MPs and officials (between 20 and 30 per cent of all participants of the respective chamber) 
does participate around once a year (i.e. 2 to 4 times within the investigated time period). For 
the Bundestag this share is even higher with around 40 per cent. Interestingly, all chambers 
have about ten MPs or officials who are very frequently at inter-parliamentary meetings.  
Considering the share of government versus opposition MPs participating in inter-
parliamentary meetings two points become apparent: from the two upper houses the parties 
which are not in government are equally strong represented as the one´s from government 
parties. For Denmark and Portugal the distortion in favour of governing parties is only 
minimal, while for the lower houses of France and Germany government parties are much 
more frequently at the events than opposition parties. For the Assemblée National the 
governing party is twice as often present as the members from parties in minority (see Table 
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5). This finding supports the expectations from H2 that opposition parties in a strong position 
at domestic level will participate more frequently in inter-parliamentary meetings. 
 
 
GOV OPP SUM MPs 
Denmark 42 34 76 
France-NA 63 22 85 
France-SE
11
 37 36 73 
Germany-BT 77 49 126 
Germany-BR
12
 20 19 39 
Portugal 85 75 160 
Table 5: Frequency of participation in all formats of inter-parliamentary meetings by majority and opposition 
parties for the time period from 2011 to 2013. 
 
The general conferences: COSAC and EU Speakers` Conference 
Disentangling the type of meetings, the various priorities in formal cooperation of the 
chambers become clearer. For COSAC meetings and the EU Speakers` Conference the 
participation rate of MPs indicates that parliaments always send a delegation except for 
Bundesrat delegates not being represented EU Speakers` Conference (see Table 6). The 
biannual COSAC meetings are highly frequented: the German Bundestag, the French 
chambers and Denmark send on average roughly two MPs. Portugal is present with a quote of 
3.42 MPs per meeting. For the participation of officials the high number for Denmark at 
COSAC stands out. The effect is moderated, if the two COSAC meetings in Copenhagen 
during the Danish presidency are not included (where 16 officials participated). Still there is a 
strong base of support by Danish officials working on EU affairs at the COSAC meetings. 
The staff members return repeatedly to COSAC.  
The EU Speakers` Conference is strongly supported by the administrative level for all 
chambers. Similarly, the continuity of the staff members preparing the EU Speakers` 
Conference and supporting their presidents is very high. Portugal is the only country to send 
more than one parliamentarian to the EU Speakers` Conference, at times including MPs from 
the opposition.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Please note that for the upper houses I have coded the party which does not hold the government as opposition 
party – not the minority necessarily the minority in the chamber.  
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COSAC   EU Speakers` Conference 
PARTICIPATION rate MPs officials MPs officials 
Denmark 23 47 3 21 
France-NA 18 23 4 14 
France-SE 21 13 4 21 
Germany-BT 25 18 3 28 
Germany-BR 13 13 0 13 
Portugal 41 17 9 14 
Table 6: Participation rate at COSAC and EU Speakers` Conferences in the period from 2011 to 2013. A total 
number of 12 COSAC meetings, three EU Speakers conference and three preparatory meetings at administrative 
level took place. 
 
According to the 21st COSAC biannual report all six chambers evaluate COSAC positively in 
terms of networking. However, the content of the conference – the agenda and the quality of 
the debate – is criticized by most chambers. Information from the interviews is in line with 
these findings. Interview partners termed COSAC to be “not really interesting” (PTP05), to 
leave you “with empty hands” (FANA10) or even as “a waste of time” (PTP01). The 
Portuguese interview partner explained the criticism on the quality of the debate with a lack of 
dialogue among the speakers. The following statement of a French Senator summarizes the 
criticism towards the quality of debate at COSAC: “The institutionalised fora that we have, 
e.g. COSAC, are much too general and formal. You go there and you listen to a long speech of 
Commissioner 1, then to a long speech of Commissioner 2, and so on. This takes a lot of time 
and is not very productive... Having said this, I do not say that there are not bilateral meetings 
at the margins of COSAC that may be very good.” (FSEP07) Thus, the networking effect and 
informal exchange on the side of the event seems to be relevant enough to participate despite 
the perceived low quality of debate. Participation rates show that MPs are present despite their 
criticism of the official agenda. COSAC is the one conference with the highest return rate of 
its participants. Interview partners in Denmark valued COSAC as a very well established 
platform for exchange which has allowed a network of personal contacts to grow which can 
be used in daily practice (DKA01).  
The EU Speakers` Conference and the COSAC chairpersons meetings are quite firmly in the 
hands of government parties. Denmark is the only member state where opposition MPs 
regularly send the one delegate to the COSAC chairpersons meeting. For Denmark, the look 
at repeated participation reveals that EAC Chair (and prior Vice-Chair) returns with high 
continuity to COSAC meetings. Thus, her continued presence in parliament and focus on EU 
issues may in part explain the presence of opposition MPs at the COSAC chairpersons 
meeting. 
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In general, the COSAC chairpersons meetings are attended by one MP of the government 
party only (holding the EAC chair), whereas MPs of government and opposition parties are 
equally present at plenary sessions of COSAC. For all chambers the EAC chairs – usually 
from governing parties – take part very continuously. In the French Sénat one MP of UMP 
and one affiliated with the PS are both present at all COSAC plenary sessions. In other 
chambers the opposition members change more frequently than the EAC chairs stemming 
from the government. Thus, the networking effect is stronger for members of governing 
parties.  
In sum, regarding the EU Speakers` Conference and COSAC the participation of national 
parliaments is fairly similar. Denmark is the only parliament to be at times represented by a 
member of opposition at COSAC meetings. This is in line with the expectation on higher 
leverage of opposition parties under minority governments (H2).  
Inter-Parliamentary Meetings organized by the EP or the rotating presidency 
Compared to COSAC and the EU Speakers` Conference, the inter-parliamentary meetings 
organized by the EP or the rotating presidency show a lower level of participation and more 
variation across chambers (see Table 6). For each format of inter-parliamentary meetings – 
ICMs organized by the EP and chairpersons` meetings by the rotating presidency – an average 
of about one meeting per month has been organized in the time period of investigation. 
Table 7: Participation rate inter-parliamentary meetings from the EP and the rotating presidency in the period 
from 2011 to 2013. Numbers in brackets indicate the participation rate excluding meetings during the Danish 
presidency.  
 
The German Bundestag and the Assembleia da República both participate intensively in these 
inter-parliamentary meetings. For the Bundestag the high number of officials present at ICMs 
at the EP stands out. It can be explained with the size of the permanent representation of the 
Bundestag (see below, section on permanent representatives). The two French chambers range 
in the middle on participation in ICMs organized by the EP and meetings of chairpersons.  
The Folketing is the only chamber to demonstrate a significant difference between the 
participation at ICMs at the EP (10) or those of the presidency (40). If taking out the meetings 
Type of meeting ICMs (EP) 
Chairpersons` meetings 
(rotating presidency) 
 
MPs officials MPs officials 
Denmark 10 14 40(20) 18(17) 
France-NA 24 23 31 21 
France-SE 22 23 22 18 
Germany-BT 48 77 46 36 
Germany-BR 13 4 13 8 
Portugal 44 27 58 8 
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organized during the Danish presidency the share decreases to 20 MPs present at meetings of 
the rotating presidency during the three years investigated. Yet, it is still twice as high as the 
participation at ICMs at the EP. In the 21st COSAC biannual report Denmark indicates that the 
quality of debate, especially the time for interventions of MPs, at ICMs at the EP is lower than 
those at ICMs of the rotating presidency. Danish interview partners explain the low priority 
with the fact that the parliament is too small to send MPs to each ICM despite the lack of 
actual decision-making at those meetings. Rather the participation of Danish MPs is issue 
dependent (DKA01, DKA02, DKP06).  
Whereas participation from the side of German Bundestag’s MPs is comparatively high, 
interview partners did not value this form of IPC as a very relevant or effective channel. Thus, 
the high participation rate may rather be explained by the higher amount of resources 
available to parliament than the political priority supporting H3.  
The share of governing and opposition MPs is only slightly in favour for the majority at ICMs 
for most chambers (see Annex). At the chairpersons` meeting government parties are more 
dominant except for Portugal which shows a strong representation of opposition members at 
these meetings as well. Interestingly, non-government MPs of the two upper houses are about 
twice as often present as members from governing parties at ICMs. They make intensive use 
of this link to the EP. On the opposite, MPs from the French lower house who are in 
opposition are barely present at chairpersons` meetings. The presence of members of 
opposition parties at these meetings seems to be roughly in line with H2 which regards the 
strength of opposition as explanatory factor. The upper houses may represent some leverage 
for non-government MPs. 
In regard of the hypotheses formulated above, the strength of parliamentary control over EU 
affairs (H1) may in part be an explanation for the engagement in IPC. The low priority of the 
Danish parliament for participation in ICMs at the EP and the negative evaluation by German 
MPs of the benefit of these meetings, indicates that these parliaments have more effective 
channels of information and influence available. The French Sénat and the Portuguese 
parliament are very active on the other hand and have been rated to have weak formal rights 
over EU issues.  
 
Informal contacts to EP and among national parliaments 
Beyond these formal channels of cooperation, MPs and parliamentary administrators interact 
informally. Here, the vertical links to MEPs and the horizontal connection to other national 
parliaments is of interest. Interview partners from all member states indicated that the 
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connection to MEPs of the same nationality and along party lines is most important source of 
information and coordination on EU issues.  
The Danish MEPs travel monthly to the Folketing for meetings with the EAC. Of the four 
case studies the Danish Parliament is the only to have structured this contact on an inter-
parliamentary level in this form, thus, not along the line of party families. However, the 
thirteen Danish MEPs are not able to cover all EP committees. Here, non-national contacts to 
EP committee members serve as a substitute (DKP07). 
For members of the Bundestag, the contact to MEPs is focused on contacts with 
parliamentarians from the same party family and primarily with German MEPs. The European 
party groups play an important role as some organize regular meetings. The party contacts are 
described to have an 'early warning' function as MEPs draw attention to developments at EU 
level at an early stage in the policy making cycle which may become relevant for their 
domestic colleagues. 
For vertical cooperation, the contact to MEPs which hold the rapporteurship on a certain 
proposed legislation is important. The rapporteurs from the European Parliament are often 
invited to committee meetings in the Bundestag or contacted in form of video conferences 
(DBTA09). However, most often, only if the rapporteurs are German. Here the Bundestag is 
in clear advantage to be able to use this source of first-hand information on the ongoing 
negotiation process, since the high number of German MEPs in the EP leads to more frequent 
rapporteurs where the national ties play in favour of the Bundestag. This opportunity seems to 
make the formal channels of cooperation less interesting. The German interview partners were 
the most coherently critical ones towards formal IPC. 
The Assembleia da República invites the Portuguese MEPs once a year to a large public 
hearing. Here, the most relevant upcoming EU initiatives which should be scrutinized in the 
next year are tried to be identified (PTA02). The bilateral contacts to the EP are clearly 
structured along party lines and nationality. The governing party of the legislative term 
beginning in June 2011 (CSD-PP and PSD) can benefit from a well-established network 
within the EPP (PTP06). 
Both French chambers have regular exchange with the French MEPs. The Assemblée 
Nationale holds three to four meetings per year between EAC members and ten to fifteen 
MEPs. The permanent representative supports visits of MPs to Brussels on a weekly basis 
(FANA09). The French Sénat is involved in joint meetings of the Assemblée, French 
members of the EP twice a year (FSEA03). Increasingly Senators are travelling to Brussels to 
inform themselves. The permanent representative of the Sénat accounted of 28 visits in the 
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parliamentary session from 2010 to 2011 and 29 between 2011 and 2012. However, 
evaluations of the relation to the EP by French MPs are ambivalent. Some interviewees 
perceived a lack of sufficient cooperation. Regarding the relationship between MEPs and 
French parliamentarians the sense of competition and superiority of one level of 
parliamentary representation over the other is still present (FSEP06) those understood to be 
ameliorating (FSEP05). Some prefer the vertical cooperation with the EP (FSEP04) while 
others see bilateral contacts to other national parliaments as more efficient (FANA12). 
National parliament permanent representatives 
All parliaments have sent one member of staff as permanent representative to the EP. Danish, 
and Portuguese interview partners describe the national parliament representative in the EP is 
the most important contact and source of information at administrative level (FANA09, 
FSEA08, FSEA03, PRP06, PTA02, PTP05). Similarly, the permanent representatives of the 
Assemblée Nationale and the Sénat are considered a very important tool to be informed on 
other parliaments positions on subsidiarity questions and coordination (FANA09, FSEA08, 
FSEA03). The analysis of the lists of participants reveals that permanent representatives are 
present repeatedly at many inter-parliamentary meetings. 
A specialty of the German case study is also linked to the size of the member state and its 
resources. The Bundestag’s entire EAC travels to Brussels once per year where they also meet 
with EP committees (DBTA09, DBTA10). However, the contact to the EP is not the priority 
for the German committees which rather focus on the connection to the Commission on these 
occasions (DBTA09). 
Germany is the only country to have located the office of the national parliamentary 
representative outside of the EP building and to have staff from the political groups located 
there as well. Each party group present in the Bundestag has one or several staff in Brussels. 
Furthermore, the parliamentary representative is supported by several administrators, each 
responsible for a number of policy areas. National parliaments` permanent representatives 
from most of the other member states do not have more than a secretary or intern for their 
support. The capacity to have an administrative unit instead of a single person in the liaison 
office in Brussels is clearly linked to the amount of resources available (H3). The higher 
number of staff of the parliamentary representation, and even more so the presence of staff 
from the national political groups, changes the logic of inter-action with the MPs of the 
Bundestag in comparison to other national parliaments.  In general the contact of permanent 
representatives from all member states with the domestic parliament is concentrated on the 
administrative level. For the German case, this further differentiates further due to the party 
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group offices in Brussels. The administrative unit of the Bundestag and the EAC secretariat 
are in frequent contact with the permanent representative. However, staffs from MPs are in 
touch with their party’s representatives in Brussels, more than with the permanent 
representative (DBTA06, DBTP03). An assistant of an EAC member in the Bundestag 
defined the party's office in Brussels as the most important channel to receive information on 
EU issues (DBTA06). 
Conclusion 
This paper has set out to explain the participation of national parliaments in IPC in cross-
national comparison. Thereby the channels of IPC are understood to perform to different 
degree the functions of cooperation such as information access, networking and coordination 
of common positions.  
It is a common assumption that parliaments with good access to information and 
comparatively strong influence on the government position will be less inclined to invest in 
links beyond the national arena such as IPC. Hypothesis 1 can partially be confirmed based on 
the findings of this study. The Danish parliament, considered the textbook model of strong EU 
scrutiny, and the MPs from the German Bundestag who holds strong formal rights are both 
rather sceptical of formal IPC. The Folketing does, however, value the transnational links as 
through COSAC and informal contacts. On the opposite, the Portuguese parliament and the 
French Sénat with limited influence are willing to invest their resources in IPC. 
A second hypothesis expected that the room of manoeuvre for opposition parties will depend 
on their domestic strength as indicated by the type of government, the political system 
(presidential or parliamentary) and the logic of bicameralism. The presence of opposition MPs 
is strongly dependent on the overall number of MPs which a parliament or chamber sends to 
the formal meetings. The strongest presence at all kinds of meetings – even the EU Speakers` 
Conference – have member of the opposition in Portugal. The Danish case of minority 
government allows for some leverage, as it is the only country where opposition MPs are 
frequently present at chairpersons` meetings. Furthermore, members of non-government 
parties of the upper houses use the possibility to connect to the EP in ICMs frequently. Future 
research should further assess the interrelation of opposition parties in bicameral systems.  
Resources in terms of the time of MPs, staff and travel costs are a precondition for the 
participation in IPC. However, H3 on the relevance of the size of parliament in number of 
seats and the overall budget can only partly explain the frequency of participation in inter-
parliamentary meetings. The Portuguese Assembleia clearly defies the budgetary restrictions 
and has a high priority for presence at all inter-parliamentary meetings often with several 
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MPs. The Bundestag on the other extreme does not stand out in terms of participation of 
parliamentarians at the meetings. However, the capacity to establish an independent well-
staffed permanent representation and the high presence of staff at meetings indicates that 
resources matter at the administrative level. Size matters as well in the link to the EP: German 
MPs can benefit from the higher number of German MEPs who in consequence more 
frequently hold the rapporteurship on an EU policy proposal. Thus, German MPs have good 
access to the political dimension of EU developments. 
Overall, the use of the different channels by the investigated parliaments show quite some 
coherence. COSAC is attended with high frequency and continuity despite the negative 
evaluation of its content and seems to provide an important networking opportunity for EU 
specialists of all MS. Similarly, the permanent representatives are evaluated as an important 
link to the Brussels arena by all interviewees. The inter-parliamentary meetings of the EP and 
the rotating presidency and the link to the MEPs show more variation. While the MEPs of the 
same nationality and party family are the first address in most cases, the frequency of contacts 
is structured differently across chambers. The Danish case with regular monthly meetings at 
the Folketing is probably the most structured approach. For German parliamentarians the 
contact to German rapporteurs and MEPs in all committees is an excellent opportunity for 
access to information.  
The similarity in the approach to IPC by the parliaments analysed suggests that the inter-
connection in the parliamentary dimension evolves to a denser network. However, the critical 
views on the content of official agendas and debates at many kinds of inter-parliamentary 
meetings indicate that IPC still has room to develop into forum for the “voice of opposition” 
within the EU political system.  
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gov opp gov opp 
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Denmark 9 14 3 0 
France-NA 13 5 4 0 
France-SE 10 11 4 0 
Germany-BT 16 9 3 0 
Germany-BR 9 4 0 0 
Portugal 25 16 5 4 
Table 8: Participation rate of MPs at COSAC and the EU Speakers` Conference in the time period form 2011 and 
2013 in view of party status. Overall 12 COSAC meetings, 3 EU Speakers` Conferences took place. 
 
 
ICM (EP)  
Chairpersons` meetings 
(rotating presidency)  
PARTICIPATION rate gov opp gov opp 
Denmark 5 5 25(11) 15(9) 
France-NA 14 10 26 5 
France-SE 7 15 13 9 
Germany-BT 27 21 29 17 
Germany-BR 5 8 6 7 
Portugal 23 21 27 31 
Table 9: Participation rate of MPs at ICMs and chairpersons` meetings in the time period form 2011 and 2013 in 
view of party status. Overall 35 ICMs and 38 meetings of chairpersons took place. 
 
 
 
